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Abstract
Post-industrialization and occupational change considerably complicate partisan pol-
itics of the welfare state. This paper asks about the determinants of contemporary
social democratic labor market policy. We argue that the composition of their support
base is a critical constraint and empirically demonstrate that the actual size of different
voter segments decisively affects policy outcomes under left government. We calculate
the electoral relevance of two crucial subgroups of the social democratic coalition, labor
market insiders and outsiders, in 19 countries and combine these indicators with orig-
inal data capturing the specific content of labor market reforms. The analysis reveals
considerable levels of responsiveness and demonstrates that electoral relevance is con-
sistently related to policy outcomes. Social democratic governments with a stronger
support base among the atypically employed push labor market reforms on their behalf
— and vice versa. Our findings have important implications for our understanding of
policy-making in post-industrial societies.
SER Keywords: labor market institutions; social policy; political parties; employment;
comparative politics; political economy.
JEL Keywords: P16; J48; E24.
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Introduction: Social Democratic Dilemmas
The traditional view on the party politics of the welfare state held that left parties de-
fend pro-welfare stances favoring their lower-class constituency and parties from the right
aim to limit welfare spending in the interest of their better-off supporters. However, more
contemporary perspectives emphasize that welfare politics have become more complex and
more multifaceted in post-industrial societies (see Häusermann et al., 2013). One crucial
factor adding complexity to the debate is the fact that the composition of political parties’
support coalitions have undergone substantial transformation since the end of the indus-
trial age. The literature agrees that the electorate of the social democratic party, the most
important supporter of the welfare state in the traditional view, has been reshuffled par-
ticularly strongly (Rennwald and Evans, 2014; Gingrich and Häusermann, 2015; Evans and
Tilley, 2017; Oesch and Rennwald, 2018). Clearly, a fundamentally altered support coalition
calls for programmatic renewal and raises the question of which factors shape contemporary
social democratic policy-making.
Programmatic re-orientation involves tough decisions since realigned voter segments pro-
vide parties with less clear, often heterogeneous and perhaps even conflicting signals with
respect to their policy preferences. This is particularly true in the domain of welfare states
and labor market policy, where social democratic parties face challenging trade-offs as a
result of voter realignment. The programmatic dilemmas social democratic parties face in
post-industrial societies have been described in different flavors but are always rooted in the
vanishing of a homogeneous, unitary block of working class voters. Based on the evolution
of post-Fordist societies and a two-dimensional policy space, Kitschelt (1994) described the
trade-off between catering to the traditional blue-collar electorate and appealing to the grow-
ing white-collar constituency. In a similar vein, Gingrich and Häusermann (2015) showed
that the Left has successfully substituted the decline in working class support with attract-
ing votes among specific part of the educated middle class, leading to a "middle-class shift"
in the welfare support coalition. Relying on a grouping of voters based on working condi-
tions rather than class, Lindvall and Rueda (2014) emphasized the dilemma European social
democratic parties are caught in due to the division of their traditional support coalition
into insiders holding secure jobs and outsiders in atypical or precarious employment.
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Consequently, the question is no longer whether left parties represent their electorate but
rather which part of their (potential) electorate they should side with. And this decision has
crucial implications regarding the content and priorities of social democratic policy-making.
The existing literature has not provided unequivocal answers to this question. In the light
of the declining number of jobs in manufacturing, Kitschelt (1994) expects "electorally ra-
tional" social democratic parties to increasingly focus on white-collar constituencies. The
dominating interpretation of the dualization literature, in contrast, is that social democratic
parties will and do consider insiders their core constituency (Rueda, 2005, 2006). The "indus-
trial blueprint" (Häusermann et al., 2016) of stable, protected full-time insider employment
is often found exactly in those shrinking sectors Kitschelt identifies as less and less profitable
to mobilize. Post-industrialization and occupational change thus considerably complicate
partisan politics of the welfare state and electoral shifts demand re-thinking our assumptions
of whose interests social democratic parties represent (Häusermann et al., 2013). Increas-
ingly fragmented voter groups with distinct policy priorities provide ambivalent or even
conflicting signals and parties have to balance and prioritize these demands.
We contend that the "electoral relevance" of distinct voter segments among a party’s
support coalition is an obvious but all-to-often neglected determinant of policy-making in
the face of increasingly heterogeneous electorates. Based on the concept of dynamic rep-
resentation (Stimson et al., 1995), we argue that social democratic labor market policy is
directed by politically powerful subgroups among their diverse support coalition. "Rational
anticipation", that is, the calculation of future electoral implications of dominating views
among the electorate, affects policy priorities and hence shapes policy outcomes. Widespread
private and public opinion polling allows for increasingly precise detection of such dominant
attitudes.
We support our conjecture by explicitly studying the varying composition of social demo-
cratic voter coalitions across time and space. Following the influential dualization literature
(Rueda, 2005; Emmenegger et al., 2012), we focus on labor market insiders and outsiders.
We largely draw on the original, status-based classification as proposed by Rueda (2005)
because we need clear-cut categorizations to calculate the relative size of the groups.1 We
then apply Axelrod’s (1972) concept of the "contribution to a coalition" to create empirical
measures of insiders’ and outsiders’ relative political weight and assess their implication on
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actual labor market policy implementation under left government. To this end, we leverage
large-scale individual-level data to operationalize those groups’ contribution to the social
democratic coalition as well as original, hand-coded data on labor market reforms to cap-
ture policy output. The empirical analysis demonstrates (a) considerable cross-national and
temporal variance in the relative electoral weight of insiders and outsiders and, more im-
portantly, (b) the explanatory power of relative electoral relevance when it comes to actual
policy outcomes. The larger the share of atypically employed voters in the social demo-
cratic support coalition, the more favorable are the implemented labor market reforms to
the demands of labor market outsiders, and vice versa.
Our results have important implications for political science research beyond the specific
case of the insider/outsider divide and social democratic party strategies. We highlight the
role of distinct voter segments’ relative electoral relevance for parties aiming at dynamically
representing decisive parts of their electorate, emphasizing that the underlying logic equally
applies to any other situation where a party is confronted with competing demands from its
core constituency. Importantly, such situations of increasingly heterogeneous electorates are
a core characteristic of post-industrial societies and have become much more prevalent due
to the erosion of traditional class voting (Oesch, 2006; Evans and Tilley, 2017; Oesch and
Rennwald, 2018). We make a strong case for the argument that accounting for the relative
political significance of different constituencies considerably adds to a more complete and
encompassing understanding of policy-making in times of increasing electoral volatility.
The Puzzle: Pro-Outsider Labor Market Reforms
We focus on labor market insiders and outsiders because these groups are both considered
part of the social democratic core electorate but have been shown to have conflicting interests
when it comes to labor market policy (Burgoon and Dekker, 2010; Marx, 2014; Häusermann
et al., 2015). The dominating interpretation of the literature is that social democratic par-
ties will and do consider insiders their core constituency (Rueda, 2005, 2006), in particular
when they face a high level of political constraints (Hübscher, 2017). The theoretical jus-
tification of social democrats’ decision to side with insiders is substantially based on the
crucial assumption of outsiders being disenchanted with politics. In Rueda’s words, there
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is "the important fact that [...] outsiders tend to be less politically active and electorally
relevant (as well as economically independent) than insiders" (2006, p. 388). Ten years
later, the premise of politically alienated labor market outsiders appears to have become
an unquestioned standard assumption in political economy. In an influential recent edited
volume, labor market outsiders are plainly dismissed as "not a powerful electoral group in
contemporary capitalist democracies" (Beramendi et al., 2015, p. 23).
As a consequence, one would expect social democratic parties to cater primarily or solely
to their well-protected core voters and implement labor market policies that are distinctly in
favor of insiders. However, a closer look at the more recent history of labor market reforms
does not support this one-sided perspective. We have collected and hand-coded the policy
content of the entire universe of labor market reforms enacted between 2000 and 2016 in
Continental and Southern Europe. We describe the data in more detail below. For the
moment, the reader only needs to know that the fine-grained coding allows to disentangle
the distributional consequences of reforms in different domains of labor market policy for
insiders and outsiders. Figure 1 shows a descriptive overview of enacted reforms in the
fields of active labor market policy (ALMP) and employment protection legislation (EPL)
(Figure SI2.2 provides a breakdown by country). Positive values on the Y-axis describe
expansionary reforms, negative values indicate retrenchment. Various aspects of this Figure
are noteworthy. First of all, there is no general trend of across-the-board retrenchment,
despite the austerity pressure created by the Great Recession. Rather, governments have cut
back social security in specific domains, primarily regarding employment protection (EPL)
for both insiders and outsiders. Much in contrast, many governments enacted expansionary
reforms in the field of active labor market policy over the course of the last two decades.
This is largely in line with the existing literature describing the expansion of activation and
social investment policies more broadly (Morel et al., 2012; Bonoli, 2013; Garritzmann et al.,
2016). Even though the extent to which countries have implemented pro-outsider and social
investment policies varies a lot (Hemerijck, 2015), the overall focus on ALMP at the cost
of EPL provides clear evidence against pronounced pro-insider policies since it is mainly
outsiders who demand and benefit from activation policies (Rueda, 2005).
This reading is reaffirmed by our reform data, which also coded the distributive im-
plications of implemented reforms by differentiating between policies targeting insiders as
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Figure 1: Effects of ALMP and EPL Reforms on Insiders and Outsiders, Continental and Southern
Europe, 2000-2016.
Countries: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain.
opposed to policies targeting outsiders (in both directions, i.e. with respect to cut-backs
as well as expansion). The strong focus of expansionary reforms on ALMP in conjunction
with the fact that this kind of policy specifically aims at integrating and activating out-
siders results in a surprisingly large share of policy reforms that mainly benefit labor market
outsiders in vulnerable employment situations. On the other hand, standard employment
protection for insiders has been increasingly deregulated, especially since the onset of the
Great Recession.2
The considerable skew of labor market reforms in favor of outsiders in recent years is
difficult to explain when neglecting how party constituencies have changed over time. From
a vote-seeking perspective, a specific electorate is only worth rallying if it is sufficiently
large and, in addition, likely to take part in politics. We argue that the existing literature
has neglected and/or underestimated both the size of and the turnout rate among labor
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market outsiders, leading to a widespread but misleading image of an electorally irrelevant
group. The first part of this paper thus aims to correct this allegedly commonsensical view
on inert and insignificant outsiders. We demonstrate that the electoral relevance of labor
market outsiders varies strongly across countries and regions. While in some countries the
well-protected core of labor market insiders still accounts for the largest share of labor, in
others, non-standard employment has in fact become the new standard.3 The rapid spread of
atypical employment in many post-industrial democracies provides temporal variation in the
relative size of labor market outsiders, which we exploit in a second step in order to assess
the impact on labor market policy under left government. This differential development
attributes varying electoral weight to the two groups, resulting in either an accentuated or
weakened political dilemma for social democratic parties.
Our point of departure ties in with a burgeoning literature on the changing social demo-
cratic electorate in post-industrial societies (Best, 2011; Karreth et al., 2013; Gingrich and
Häusermann, 2015; Abou-Chadi and Wagner, 2019). Gingrich and Häusermann (2015), for
example, study the social democratic support coalition by distinguishing between different
classes based on respondents’ occupation and education level. This approach shares some
obvious similarities with ours but also has some important differences. The main overlap
concerns the fact that outsiders cluster in certain occupational groups. However, since this
clustering is far from perfect4, our outsider category to some extent cross-cuts occupational
groups. Whereas Gingrich and Häusermann (2015) focus exclusively on the differences be-
tween manual workers and the middle class, we expand the analysis by focusing on the entire
group of workers. Most importantly, we thereby also include the significantly large group
that Gingrich/Häusermann call routine workers5, which faces by far the highest prevalence
of labor market vulnerability.
Determinants of Social Democratic Labor Market Policy
Political parties are important intermediary organizations that are expected to transmit
preferences among the population — and particularly among their electorate — into pol-
icy outcomes. Broadly speaking, the vast literature on the determinants of political parties’
position and/or issue emphasis6 can be divided into two camps. The first promotes a distinc-
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tive top-down perspective on policy making by emphasizing parties’ strategic considerations
to steer public debate towards issues they "own". Selectively highlighting their own policy
issues turns elections into a contest on favorable home turf, which is generally expected to
yield electoral gains (Petrocik, 1996; Bélanger and Meguid, 2008; Klüver, 2018).
The large literature dealing with representation and responsiveness, by contrast, posits
quite a different view on the determinants of policy outcomes. In its most general formu-
lation, the core idea behind "dynamic representation" is that vote-seeking parties need to
follow the mood of the public in order to secure electoral gains (Stimson et al., 1995). In
such a bottom-up process, parties are expected to take cues from voters and adjust their
policy platform (e.g. Adams et al., 2004) or their issue emphasis (e.g. Klüver and Spoon,
2016) in a way that signals responsiveness and increases the chances of electoral support.
We do not attempt to settle this debate since the two perspectives are difficult to clearly
disentangle due to obvious endogeneity concerns. Presumably, both apply to some extent
(see Steenbergen et al., 2007). Parties certainly have strategic leeway in framing, issue
emphasis and agenda setting. However, we contend that elite decisions on policy platforms
do not occur in a vaccuum and political parties’ room for maneuvre is thus most likely
constrained by the distribution of preferences in the population. Consequently, we argue
that parties’ labor market policy positions are at least partly directed by the demands of
politically powerful voter segments. "Rational anticipation" (Stimson et al., 1995), i.e. the
calculation of future electoral implications of currently dominating views among the social
democratic electorate, is expected to significantly impinge on social democratic parties’
policy priorities and hence to shape policy outcomes under left government. While generally
in line with traditional welfare state literature emphasizing bottom-up influence of powerful
voter segments (Korpi, 1983), our more contemporaneous take on social policy reforms
acknowledges that welfare politics have turned from a positive-sum into a zero-sum game
(Häusermann, 2010). Put differently, social democrats — and any other party, for that
matter — have to prioritize some policy domains over others and cannot equally satisfy
distinct (expansionary) demands from among their electorate.
The concept of rational anticipation explicitly posits an image of well-informed politi-
cians/parties seeking re-election and thus strategically adjusting their political programs to
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the dominating voice in their — perhaps quite heterogeneous — support coalition. Abou-
Chadi and Wagner (2019) indeed show that mainstream left parties gain votes by taking
up investment-oriented positions, which have become increasingly popular among the social
democratic electorate (Gingrich and Häusermann, 2015). In a similar vein, we would expect
social democratic parties to adjust their policy priorities to the balance of power within their
core electorate. Instead of focusing on party manifestos, as most of the existing literature,
we aim to go one step further and look at a more consequential outcome. We study the rela-
tionship between the composition of the electorate and actually implemented policy reforms
once parties win elections and form the government.
More specifically, we hypothesize that the country-specific electoral relevance of labor
market outsiders relative to insiders affects the kind of labor market reforms social demo-
cratic parties implement when in government. Our argument has four observable implica-
tions. (1) Mere group size of different subgroups of the population per se should not affect
policy outcomes since electoral relevance also depends on participation rates and vote choice.
(2) The electoral relevance of insiders and outsiders should not generally affect policy out-
comes. Both groups are considered part of the left core electorate and non-left governments’
policy decisions should not be affected by their relative political clout. (3) In contrast, the
relative electoral relevance of outsiders vis-a-vis insiders should impact on labor market re-
forms under governments with a significantly large share of left seats. In this case, we expect
spending for ALMP and PLMP as well as the frequency of pro-outsider reforms to increase
with outsiders’ contribution to the coalition.7 More technically speaking, the focus of the
empirical analysis is on the interaction effect between outsiders’ electoral relevance and left
government on implemented labor market reforms. (4) By implication, in countries with
electorally dominant insiders, left government should, if anything, be negatively correlated
with spending on and frequency of outsider-friendly labor market reforms.
The Changing Electoral Relevance of Insiders and Outsiders
In our assessment of electoral relevance, we build on Axelrod’s (1972) approach to study
what he called the "contribution to a coalition".8 The three parameters needed to estimate
the contribution of a group to a party’s total vote share are size, turnout and party choice
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("loyalty" in Axelrod’s terminology). In the following, we briefly discuss how the relative
electoral relevance of outsiders as opposed to outsiders has evolved over the course of the
past two or three decades.
An obvious starting point for studying the electoral relevance of different constituencies
is relative group size. Focusing on insiders and outsiders, occupational change in recent
decades has led to remarkable changes in this regard. Until the 1970s, the model of full-time
wage employment dominated the world of work. The bigger part of workers consisted of
archetypical insiders, most of them employed in the second sector. This pattern steadily
changed in the course of continuous deindustrialization and the concomitant growth of the
service-sector. The rise of novel forms of atypical employment, most importantly temporary
and (involuntary) part-time work, has become a central issue in all advanced post-industrial
democracies (De Grip et al., 1997). Figure 2 displays the remarkable spread of atypical em-
ployment in Europe since the 1980s. While unemployment seems to be dominated by cyclical
trends, temporary employment has constantly been on the rise since the early 1980s. The
most recent economic crisis has further reinforced the spread of labor market vulnerability
as the hardest hit sectors have, again, been those dominated by insiders: manufacturing and
construction (Autor, 2010).
Critical mass is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for achieving electoral relevance.
Based on the assumption of low political activity, Rueda maintained that social democrats
will cater to insiders even if outsiders are "numerous" (2005, p. 86). Therefore, the second
important aspect of electoral relevance is turnout. If policy makers assume every second
individual of a specific subgroup of society to go to the ballot, the electoral relevance of this
subgroup is only half of what it could be. What do we know about turnout among outsiders?
Although existing research provides some evidence for lower political activity (Häusermann
and Schwander, 2012; Rovny and Rovny, 2017), the actual magnitude of the participation
gap between insiders and outsiders deserves some more attention. As labor market risks have
"spread well into the more highly educated segments of the population" (Häusermann et al.,
2015, p. 235; see also Table SI2.1), the rise of outsiderness goes hand in hand with a steady
shift in its composition. Contemporary labor market vulnerability is by no means restricted
to the poor and low skilled, the usual suspects of non-voting (Leighley and Nagler, 2013),
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Figure 2: Share of atypical employment in Europe, in % of working-age population (Source: OECD
Employment Database; data weighted by population).
The remaining crucial aspect in a discussion about the electoral relevance of a specific
group is party choice. Traditional insider/outsider theory has been more than clear on the
prime example of a social democratic voter: the well-protected insider. However, we suspect
that support for the Left among insiders is overestimated, whereas it is underestimated
in the case of outsiders, resulting in a much less clear-cut picture. First, we argue that
social democratic parties are a likely choice for outsiders. On election day, voters have to
choose from existing "policy packages" (Emmenegger, 2009) and need to compromise. The
existing literature has heavily focused on employment protection to justify the expectation
of strong support for social democrats among insiders but weak or even inexistent support
among outsiders. However, the overall package offered by social democrats might still be
one of the more interesting options for the latter. Indeed, Picot and Menéndez (2017) show
that policies to mitigate the adverse effects of non-standard employment are clearly the
domain of left parties and Schwander (2018), more specifically, shows that social democrats
do address outsiders’ concerns to a significant extent in electoral campaigns. Outsiders thus
might support social democratic parties despite their adherence to employment protection
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since an ideal policy package that matches preferences in each and every policy domain is
hardly available. Parties with a more skeptical stance on employment protection are likely
to combine this position with a generally critical attitude towards welfare provision. And
general social policy retrenchment cannot be in the interest of outsiders, which makes the
major right an unlikely choice (Rovny and Rovny, 2017).
Second, we question the assumption of unambiguous support for the Left among insiders.
The realignment literature has pointed out that the working class vote has experienced a
rightward shift (Gingrich and Häusermann, 2015). Right-wing populists have been shown
to successfully mobilize among moderately skilled private sector insiders (Bornschier, 2010)
and especially attract support from small business owners and production workers (Oesch,
2008). It is therefore not primarily precariousness or low wages that drives workers into
the arms of right-wing populist parties but rather the fear of losing status and/or privileges
that were previously deemed protected (Gidron and Hall, 2017; Kurer, 2017). As insiders
are much more likely to depend on such "taken-for-granted features" (Rydgren, 2013, p.
6) than the more vulnerable outsiders, they seem especially prone to abandon the left and
instead vote for its populist competitor from the right. All in all, then, insiders might not
be so much more likely to support social democratic parties than vulnerable outsiders who
demand social policy protection as a reaction to economic insecurity (Burgoon and Dekker,
2010; Rehm, 2009; Häusermann et al., 2015).
Taken together, this section discussed several reasons why the electoral relevance of
outsiders relative to insiders might have been underestimated in previous accounts. In that
case, according to our electoral relevance argument, the surprisingly high share of pro-
outsider policy in recent years is not puzzling but a logical consequence of social democratic
parties anticipating changes in their electorate and aiming at dynamically representing their
pivotal voter.
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Measurement, Data and Method
In accordance with our theoretical explanations, we build on the following formula originally
proposed by Axelrod (1972) to empirically examine the relative electoral relevance of insiders
and outsiders for Social Democratic parties:
Electoral relevance =
(group sizeit) x (group turnoutit) x (group vote shareit)
(national turnoutt) x (national vote sharet)
The formula specifies how the three parameters size, turnout and vote share are combined
to assess the total contribution of a given group i at time t. "Group vote share" is the
estimated average probability of the group under consideration to vote for the specified
party. Most importantly for our purposes, it also provides a straightforward handle to
empirically compare the electoral relevance of one group i at time t, e.g. insiders, to that of
another, e.g. outsiders.
To be sure, not all of the constituent parameters of the above formula are entirely exoge-
nous to the specific supply-side context or electoral rules. Axelrod (1972) himself discussed
some "strategic considerations" for parties in the light of his conceptualization. While group
size is difficult to manipulate, turnout and vote choice are to some extent "elastic" to parties’
appeals. Whether citizens turn out to vote depends not only on socio-economic background
but also on electoral rules and the party system (Blais and Dobrzynska, 1998). While both
aspects certainly affect our estimates of relative electoral relevance to some extent, we do
not expect systematic biases since we are primarily interested in the difference between two
groups within the same socio-economic class in the same country. Issues of endogeneity
are more obvious with respect to the propensity to vote for Social Democrats. Elite-mass
linkages are known to be of a reciprocal nature (Steenbergen et al., 2007), meaning that it
is not only the electoral relevance of a group that affects parties’ policy stances but also,
simultaneously, the other way round. The particular policy proposals put forward will to
some extent affect the inclination of specific subgroups of the electorate, e.g. insiders or
outsiders, to vote for the party.
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In terms of conceptualization, we largely rely on the original definition of outsiders
as proposed by Rueda (2005), but coded students as outsiders only if they indeed faced
some form of atypical employment. The group of outsiders consists of part-time workers
(less than 30 hours), temporary workers and the unemployed. Insiders are workers with
a full-time permanent working contract. The residual group consists of what Rueda calls
"upscales", i.e. higher skilled professionals, large employers and business owners as well as
self-employed citizens who are not considered part of the social democratic core electorate.
More recently, the insider-outsider literature has been enriched by alternative and more
fine-grained ways to operationalize outsiderness, e.g. risk-based, continuous measures of
labor market vulnerability (Rehm, 2009; Schwander and Häusermann, 2013) or longitudinal
approaches to labor market disadvantage that take into account previous experience and
scar effects (Emmenegger et al., 2015).9 We deliberately stick to the simple initial version
because the calculation of relative group size requires a clear-cut distinction between insiders
and outsiders, which is less straightforward when using continuous measures. Furthermore,
a status-based operationalization will yield more conservative estimates of the prevalence
of outsiderness and thus prevent us from overestimating the share of outsiders based on
risk-based classifications. We test our conjectures on a sample consisting of 19 European
countries that are considered advanced capitalist democracies.10
In order to calculate the electoral relevance of insiders and outsiders, we need three pa-
rameters: group size, turnout, and vote share. For the first parameter, group size, we rely
on the large samples of EU-SILC data (2004-2015) in order to provide reliable estimates of
relative shares of both insiders and outsiders among the entire labor force. The political pa-
rameters are derived from the European Social Survey rounds 1-8 (2002-2016, see SI2.2). We
run two separate unconditional logistic regression models to calculate predicted probabilities
of the effect of labor market status on turnout and vote choice, respectively.11 Unconditional
(i.e. models without control variables) because we want to capture the effect of inherent
"outsiderness" instead of partial correlations under the control of covariates such as age,
gender or occupation. When thinking about electoral relevance of different groups, it is this
unconditional effect of outsiderness that should matter most for party strategies. Having
said that, controlling for compositional effects and thus examining partial correlations of
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outsiderness – unsurprisingly – decreases the participation gap and further strengthens our
central claim (see Table SI2.3 in the appendix).
In the second empirical part, we test our hypotheses regarding the bottom-up impact
of insiders/outsiders on different policy outcomes with a pooled times-series cross-section
(TSCS) analysis. For this, we have created a dataset that includes measures of labor market
reforms effects on insiders and outsiders, spending on active and passive labor market policy,
strength of social democratic governments, electoral relevance of insiders and outsiders, as
well as control variables. We use four different measures to assess policy outcomes.
The first two output variables are based on our original, hand-coded database that con-
tains information on the policy content of all enacted labor market reforms in Continental
and Southern Europe between 2000 and 2016. In a first step, information on all the policy
changes in the fields of employment protection legislation (EPL), passive and active labor
market policy (PLMP, ALMP), early retirement (ER) and short-time work (STW) were
collected. In total, the dataset includes 1’045 policy changes. Table SI1.1 in the Appendix
shows the detailed distribution by country and policy instrument. The focus of the coding
is on the extent to which certain policy changes insulate insiders and/or outsiders from
particular labor market risks.12 Based on the detailed explanation of the policy content
and, if available, evaluation reports and secondary literature on specific labor market re-
forms, each policy change has been assigned a value of +1 if it improves the situation of
outsiders/insiders, 0 if the policy change does not affect outsiders/insiders, and -1 if worsens
the situation of outsiders/insiders. In addition, each policy change is weighted by 1 if it is a
comprehensive reform that addresses the broader design of existing systems or by 0.5 if it is
only a marginal change. In a final step, all the reforms in one country-year are aggregated
together and measure the sum effect all the policy changes have on insiders and outsiders in
a given country-year. Data collection and coding has proceeded in several steps to ensure
that all relevant labor market reforms were found and hand-coded correctly (see Appendix
for a more detailed description on data collection and coding). In stark contrast to spending
data, such a reform measure can more clearly distinguish reform effects on insiders and out-
siders and it minimizes potential confounding factors. In addition, it allows to link policy
output more directly to the party in office, whereas it is more difficult to attribute certain
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spending outcomes to specific government decisions as reforms only become visible some
years later.
The drawback of our detailed coding is that the reform measure is only available for nine
countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and
Spain). As a reaction, we complement our empirical evaluation with traditional spending
data, despite the discussed concerns, in order to test the robustness of our results and
broaden the geographical scope of the analysis. These measures are straightforward: we
use spending on active labor market policy and spending on passive labor market policy as
indicators for pro-outsider policies. The data comes from the Comparative Political Dataset
(Armingeon et al., 2018). We try to minimize the main concern with spending data, i.e.
their interlinkage to various other factors (Clasen and Siegel, 2007), by controlling for the
most obvious confounders such as the unemployment rate and real GDP growth.
Following our theoretical argument, we are mainly interested in two explanatory variables
and their interaction: the electoral relevance of insiders/outsiders and the strength of social
democratic governments. For the former we use our measure of electoral relevance that we
have developed above13 and the latter we measure by cabinet posts hold by the main social
democratic party in percentage of total cabinet posts (weighted by the number of days in
office in a given year). We adjusted the left government variable from the CPDS I dataset
(Armingeon et al., 2018) so that cabinet posts hold by other left parties are excluded. We
include further control variables for the unemployment rate, real GDP growth and union
density (data from Armingeon et al. 2018), all lagged by one year.
In order to test our core hypothesis, we include an interaction term between the two
main explanatory variables - the strength of social democratic parties and the electoral
relevance of insiders/outsiders. It has been pointed out recently that most current research
assumes a linear interaction effect when it is in fact non-linear and that estimates often lack
common support of the moderator, i.e. excessive extrapolation (Hainmueller et al., 2018).
We therefore follow the three recommendations by Hainmueller et al. (2018): First, we
use a binning estimator that breaks the continuous moderator (Z) into three bins (dummy
variables) and interact these with the other explanatory variable (X). Second, we use a kernel
estimator that allows to flexibly estimate the functional form of the marginal effect of Z on
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Y across values of X. Third, we always plot the interaction effects together with a histogram
showing the distribution of the moderator variable in order to prevent severe extrapolation.
The diagnostics indeed demonstrate that the interaction terms are linear (see Figure SI2.4
in the Appendix).
The use of TSCS data violates several assumptions of ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression. To take the problems of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity into account,
we estimate all the models with a lagged dependent variable (LDV) and country-clustered
standard errors (Beck and Katz, 1995). Prais-Winsten (AR1) regression, instead of LDV,
results in very similar findings. We also include country-fixed effects to account for unit
heterogeneity and unobserved country-specific factors that do not vary over time (Beck,
2001).
Descriptives
The Electoral Relevance of Insiders and Outsiders
We apply Axelrod’s formula to calculate the relative electoral relevance of insiders and
outsiders for social democratic parties in 19 European countries for the years 2002 to 2016.
To reiterate, the first parameter, group size and the resulting relative group share, is derived
from EU-SILC. The additional parameters, turnout and support for social democratic parties
among both groups as well as the reference group, the national average, are estimated in the
ESS. We show the very rich but slightly overwhelming full descriptive data for all parameters
in each country in Table A1 in the appendix. Figure 3 provides a more compact overview
about the relative weight of distinct subsets of voters in the social democratic support
coalition by plotting the ratio between the electoral relevance of insiders vis-a-vis outsiders.
The horizontal line at the ratio=1 indicates perfect balance between insiders and outsiders
in terms of electoral relevance for social democratic parties. To give a reading example,
in Ireland, insiders’ contribution to the social democratic coalition (averaged over the time
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Figure 3: Electoral relevance ratio by country, average values 2002-2016
to 21.0%. This results in a slight predominance of insiders among the potential Irish social
democratic electorate (27.5/21.0=1.3).
This first descriptive evidence yields two important insights. First, insiders are (still)
electorally more relevant than outsiders. However, in many places, particularly in Conti-
nental and Southern Europe, the gap is small and perhaps not sufficient to explain social
democratic strategies abandoning the demands of outsiders. Second, the remarkable cross-
sectional, but also within-regime, variance highlights the different significance of the social
democratic dilemma across Europe. In countries like Spain, Greece but also the Netherlands,
Belgium, Ireland or Poland outsiders represent a large part of the electorate, comparable
in size to labor market insiders. In an extreme case like Spain, outsiders in fact outnumber
insiders in terms of electoral relevance.
Consequently, in these countries, social democrats truly do face a dilemma as they are
confronted with two similarly important groups of potential supporters with clearly distinct
policy preferences. In contrast, the strategic considerations for social democrats in most
Scandinavian countries, Hungary or the Czech Republic are much less complex. As the
working class is still dominated by standard employment, resulting in electoral relevance
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ratios of 3 and above, insider-friendly policies seem to be a straightforward and reasonable
programmatic choice for vote-seeking social democratic parties.
Taking electoral relevance into account helps to put the balancing act of social demo-
cratic parties into perspective. Promoting policies that benefit insiders might lead outsiders
to abandon the center-left. However, as long as one group dominates the electorate, policy
choices for vote-seeking parties are not very delicate, thus strongly mitigating the social
democratic dilemma. For example, in the Swedish case discussed by Lindvall and Rueda
(2014), an emphasis on insider policies makes sense since insiders have more than twice the
weight of outsiders (ratio=2.3) in the electorate of the Swedish Social Democratic party. In
contrast, as demonstrated by Lindvall and Rueda’s analysis, pro-outsider reforms are elec-
torally costly. Strategic decisions are even more straightforward in other Nordic countries,
where the ratio in favor of insiders is even higher. The relative electoral relevance of insiders
and outsiders thus offers the party elite a dominant strategy.
Finally, one aspect we have not addressed so far concerns the absolute electoral decline of
the social democratic vote share across Europe. To be clear, we are primarily interested in
the relative strength and, thus, policy influence of different social democratic constituencies
rather than their combined electoral relevance vis-a-vis other parties. However, we do not
want to ignore the fact that many of the analyzed social democratic parties have lost a
significant share of voters to competing parties in recent years. While it is clearly beyond
this article to provide an answer to the important question of vote switching, which requires
longitudinal data to be properly addressed, our data on the relative electoral relevance
of different sub-constituencies allows for some tentative insights. In Figure SI2.1 in the
appendix, we show how the social democratic voting propensity of the two groups, insiders
and outsiders, changes over time compared to social democrats’ national vote share. Since
we look at a relatively short period of time, in most countries we do not see spectacular
changes. Still, as expected, a steady downward trend is visible in many countries. Exceptions
are more dramatic cases like Poland and Hungary, where social democratic parties have
been almost electorally obliterated (mainly) due to corruption scandals that accelerated the
decline, visible in almost any other country. Our data does not reveal a consistent pattern
as to whether insiders are more likely than outsiders to leave social democrats.
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Results
The presentation of results is split into two sections with distinct measures of the dependent
variable (labor market policy intervention). The first part is based on our novel reform
database with original, hand-coded data for nine Continental and Southern European coun-
tries, which we consider the "gold standard" in terms of measuring policy output. The very
fine-grained coding of reforms comes at the cost of a limited sample of countries, however.
In a second step, we thus recede to more traditional spending measures in order to vali-
date our original dependent variables and to test our hypotheses with models based on a
geographically more encompassing sample with more statistical power.
Electoral Relevance and Labor Market Reform Output
How does the relative electoral relevance of insiders and outsiders affect actual social demo-
cratic policy making, i.e. labor market policy output under social democratic government?
Table 1 presents the results from our models looking at actual reform output. The coding
captures how outsiders (M1-M3) and insiders (M4-M6) have been affected by implemented
labor market reforms. As hypothesized, Model 1 and Model 4 confirm that neither the
group size of insiders nor outsiders has a direct effect on the two dependent variables. Thus,
there is no direct correlation between a change in the group size of specific subgroups of the
electorate and labor market reforms. The absence of such a functional relationship between
mere group size and policy outputs lends support to our operationalization of electoral rele-
vance that takes political mobilization into account by also including participation rates and
vote choice. Similarly, the results in Model 2 and Model 5 show that neither the strength of
social democratic governments nor the electoral relevance of insiders or outsiders has a direct
effect on the two reform measures. Again, this is an expected result given our theoretical
reasoning. Social democratic parties are expected to implement pro-outsider (insider) poli-
cies especially or even only if outsiders (insiders) form a substantial part of their electorate.
Since this is not the case across the board (see Figure 3), the pooled results should yield
weak correlations.
20
Finally, Models 3 and 6 test our main theoretical expectation regarding the interac-
tion between the strength of social democratic governments and the electoral relevance of
outsiders and insiders, respectively. The positive and statistically significant effect of the
interaction term in Model 3 is in line with our hypothesis. The larger the share of outsiders
within the social democratic electorate, the more outsider-friendly are labor market reforms
under left government. Figure 4 visualizes this interaction effect. From very low levels
of outsiders’ electoral relevance until about 0.25, the marginal effect of social democratic
government strengths’ on outsiders’ reform output is negative. In that case, the increasing
presence of social democrats in government leads to labor market reforms that worsen the
situation of outsiders. This is essentially the insider/outsider story of Rueda (2007), which
still applies to countries with a heavily insider-dominated working class. When outsiders,
however, become more relevant (at about 0.25), as they have in various countries, then
the negative effect ceases. More speculatively, judging from the figure, one could extrapo-
late that if outsiders become even more relevant in the future, we might witness a positive
marginal effect of social democratic government strengths’ on outsiders’ reform output, and
thus a reversal of insider/outsider bias of social democratic parties.
Moving on to the substantive significance of this finding, we find a marginal effect of
about -0.025 on our outsiders’ reform measure when the electoral relevance of outsiders is low
(about 0.18). This sounds like a negligible effect at first sight. However, an one-point change
in government strength is not very telling because the cabinet share of social democratic
parties in the 19 European countries under study usually varies quite drastically from one
election to another (see Figure SI2.6 in the Appendix for country-specific cabinet shares).14
A more realistic fifty-point change in the strength of social democratic governments leads to
a 1.25 point decrease in our outsiders’ reform measure. In other words, if social democrats
can improve their cabinet share by 50 percentage points, it is associated with at about
1.25 comprehensive policy changes that negatively affect outsiders, but only if outsiders
are electorally almost irrelevant. If it comes to a wholesale government alteration, which
equals a 100 percentage point change, it is related to a about two and a half comprehensive
policy changes that worsen the situation of outsiders. These are again quite substantive
effects given that the standard deviation of the outsiders’ reform measure is 2.2. Looking at
the effective policy changes that took place in a country over time (see Figure SI2.2 in the
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Table 1: Left government, electoral relevance and labor market reforms
Reform Effect on Outsiders Reform Effect on Insiders
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
L.OutsiderReform 0.102 0.121 0.087
(0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
L.InsiderReform 0.187 0.203 0.224
(0.16) (0.16) (0.15)
LeftGov -0.011 -0.074∗ -0.007 -0.123
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.08)
ElRelOutsider 2.871 -8.987 4.498 8.201
(8.15) (8.57) (9.37) (11.89)
ElRelInsider -4.002 -14.987 2.988 2.889
(19.32) (21.97) (11.94) (11.30)
LeftGov X ElRelOutsider 0.267∗
(0.11)






L.Unemploymentrate 0.022 -0.036 0.012 0.004 -0.038 -0.062
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
L.RealGDPgrowth 0.275+ 0.295+ 0.334∗ 0.211 0.211 0.117
(0.12) (0.13) (0.14) (0.17) (0.16) (0.07)
L.UnionDensity -0.146 -0.167 -0.197 -0.026 -0.029 0.024
(0.12) (0.14) (0.15) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09)
Constant -2.331 6.954 13.500∗ -4.247 -0.293 -2.518
(6.62) (4.07) (5.51) (8.89) (4.97) (5.90)
Country Fixed Effects X X X X X X
R2 0.136 0.149 0.185 0.235 0.240 0.288
AIC 474.581 474.980 472.484 418.420 419.662 414.891
BIC 490.505 493.558 493.715 434.344 438.240 436.122
N 105 105 105 105 105 105
Notes: Pooled OLS-regression with lagged dependent variable, country fixed effects and country-clustered SEs.
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Electoral Relevance of Insiders
Figure 4: Interaction LeftGov with electoral relevance of outsiders and insiders on reform effects
data (each based on Model 3 and 6 in Table 1)
Appendix), it becomes clear that our effects are substantively relevant: many actual policy
changes are of a smaller magnitude.
Model 6 in Table 1 shows that mirror image of this hypothesis, i.e. the interaction
between the electoral relevance of insiders and left governments on insider-friendly reforms,
fails to reach conventional levels of statistical significance. This stands in contrast to Model 3
and all other interactions that will follow in the next section. The right-hand side of Figure 4
visualizes this conditional relationship. Clearly, the effect goes in the expected direction but
is imprecisely estimated. This is for two reasons. This first part of the analysis only includes
countries from Continental and Southern Europe, thus substantially reducing sample size.
In addition, the distribution of insiders’ electoral relevance is much more centered than those
of outsiders on the left-hand plot in Figure 4, resulting in fewer cases on the margins with
reduces precision. In the light of these circumstances and given that at least the direction
of the effect confirms our expectations, we contend that Model 6 should not fundamentally
invalidate our all in all affirmative evidence of the main hypothesis. The next section, which
is based on more broadly available spending data, will demonstrate that we can recover this
effect with more statistical power.
Electoral Relevance and Labor Market Policy Spending
As a last step, we complement our evaluation of policy reforms with more conventional
dependent variables, i.e. measures based on spending data. The following analyses are
based on a larger sample of countries and thus represent a welcome validation of our previous
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results based on original, new data. Table 2 presents the results of spending on active and
passive labor market policy.
Again, Model 1 and Model 5 indicate that the group size of insiders and outsiders is in
itself not directly related to the level of spending on active or passive labor market policy. We
tested further in Model 2 and Model 6 whether the strength of social democratic governments
or our measures of the electoral relevance of insiders and outsiders is associated with our
two spending outcomes. As anticipated, the results show that there is hardly any direct
correlation between our three explanatory variables and our two dependent variables. The
one exception to this pattern is the significant negative correlation between the electoral
relevance of insiders and ALMP spending. Since ALMP is clearly the least beneficial policy
for insiders, perhaps even other than social democratic parties lower spending in that domain
if insiders form a large part of the electorate.
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Table 2: Left government, electoral relevance and labor market spending
ALMP Spending (in % of GDP) PLMP Spending (in % of GDP)
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8
L.ALMP 0.750∗∗∗ 0.751∗∗∗ 0.741∗∗∗ 0.757∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
L.PLMP 0.870∗∗∗ 0.876∗∗∗ 0.866∗∗∗ 0.875∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
Leftgov 0.000 -0.001∗ 0.001 0.001 -0.002+ 0.002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ElRelOutsider -0.379 -0.542∗ -0.381 -0.313 -0.693∗ -0.315
(0.25) (0.26) (0.24) (0.29) (0.30) (0.30)
ElRelInsider -0.562∗ -0.684∗∗ -0.527∗ -1.023 -1.285+ -0.977
(0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.65) (0.61) (0.70)
Leftgov X ElRelOutsider 0.006∗∗ 0.015∗
(0.00) (0.01)






L.unemploymentrate -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004+ -0.025+ -0.025∗ -0.023∗ -0.025∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
L.RealGDPgrowth -0.009∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
L.Uniondensity -0.004 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.006 0.008 0.010+ 0.009
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 0.687∗∗ 0.503∗∗∗ 0.539∗∗∗ 0.466∗∗∗ 0.416 0.489 0.543 0.438
(0.20) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.64) (0.33) (0.32) (0.37)
Country Fixed Effects X X X X X X X X
R2 0.956 0.957 0.958 0.957 0.963 0.965 0.966 0.965
AIC -575.400 -576.671 -580.706 -576.716 -163.015 -169.832 -175.097 -168.741
BIC -554.344 -552.105 -552.631 -548.641 -141.959 -145.266 -147.022 -140.666
N 247 247 247 247 247 247 247 247
Notes: Pooled OLS-regression with lagged dependent variable, country fixed effects and country-clustered SEs.
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Electoral Relevance of Outsiders
Figure 5: Interaction LeftGov with electoral relevance of outsiders on ALMP and PLMP spending
with 95%-confidence intervals (based on Model 3 and 7 in Table 2). Histograms show the distribution
of the electoral relevance of outsiders.
Models 3 and 7, are another test of our core hypothesis and provide strong and consistent
evidence in line with our expectations. For both labor market outcome measures, the inter-
action between the strength of social democratic governments and the electoral relevance of
outsiders is statistically significant and positive. This means that the stronger social demo-
cratic governments are, the more they pursue pro-outsider policies like active and passive
labor market policies if and only if the electoral relevance of outsiders is sufficiently high. As
hypothesized, the impact of social democratic governments depends upon the electoral rele-
vance of outsiders. Figure 5 visualizes the interaction effect of the two continuous variables
by presenting the marginal effects. In both cases, for low values of our outsiders’ electoral
relevance measure, we find no effect of social democratic governments on the level of active or
passive labor market policy spending. When outsiders become sufficiently relevant (at about
0.22 for ALMP and at about 0.20 for PLMP), we do find a positive and significant marginal
effect of social democratic government strengths’ on active and passive labor market policy
spending.
For an outsider value of 0.3 on our electoral relevance measure, we find a positive marginal
effect of about 0.001 percentage points for ALMP and 0.002 percentage points for PLMP
spending (both measured in % of GDP) for an one-point change in the social democratic gov-
ernment strength. A more realistic 50 or even 100 percentage point change in the strength
of social democratic governments, would be associated with a yearly percentage point in-
crease in ALMP spending equal to 0.05 or 0.10 and PLMP spending equal to 0.10 or 0.20.
Given that the standard deviation of ALMP and PLMP spending is 0.13 and 0.34, these are
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substantial changes in labor market policy spending. We can further contextualize the effect
by looking at ALMP/PLMP levels of particular countries (see Figure SI2.7 and SI2.8 in the
Appendix). In the case of Spain, for example, the share of GDP devoted to ALMP is about
0.70. A 50 or 100 percentage point change in Left government would therefore lead to a con-
siderable 7 or 14 percent yearly increase in ALMP spending. In contrast, in a counterfactual
Spain with outsiders being only half as relevant in the social democratic support coalition,
a similar increase in left government seats would not result in higher ALMP spending.
As a last step, we tested in Model 4 and Model 8 the reverse idea in the spirit of a placebo
test. Given that both active and passive labor market policy spending can be seen as a pro-
outsider policy, the interaction between the strength of social democratic governments and
the electoral relevance of insiders should be either not significant or have a negative effect.
The results indicate that the interaction term is not significant for PLMP spending and
for ALMP spending. Figure SI2.5 in the Appendix visualizes the interaction effects and
confirms that the marginal effects of social democratic governments on ALMP and PLMP
spending are not significant.
Discussion and Conclusion
This article provides two main takeaways. First, we show that the often-made assumption
of widespread political apathy among the more vulnerable part of labor does not hold under
empirical scrutiny. Especially in Continental and Southern Europe, insiders and outsiders
are of comparable electoral relevance. Given the structural developments of the past decades,
an ongoing spread of atypical work is highly likely, which will make labor market outsiders
even more relevant in the electoral arena.
Second, and more importantly, the described variation in electoral relevance is politically
consequential. This is the case with respect to both actual labor market reform outputs and
spending on different kinds of labor market policy. We demonstrate that a higher rela-
tive electoral weight of labor market outsiders is consistently related to more frequent pro-
outsider labor market reforms and increased spending on ALMP and PLMP whenever left
parties have a substantial share in government. From the perspective of electoral relevance,
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social democratic governments in the 1980s and 1990s have implemented reforms biased
against outsiders because insiders were their core electorate. As outsiders, however, become
more electorally relevant for social democratic parties over time, we witness a shift in social
democratic labor market policy-making away from the pro-insider bias emphasized in the
seminal insider/outsider literature towards more inclusive, pro-outsider oriented policies.
This result has several important implications. First of all, our results show remarkable
responsiveness of parties to their voters’ demands, even when studying the issue within po-
litical blocks. While policymakers do not blindly follow the mood of their supporters and
certainly retain some room for strategic maneuver, we demonstrate that policy implemen-
tation is systematically related to the relative electoral weight of different groups within the
support coalition. In contrast to much of the existing work, we do not study what parties
promise in their manifestos but what they really do in terms of policy output. This finding
ties in with the idea that parties anticipate and deliver what their pivotal voter wants in
order to maximize votes and increase chances for re-election (Stimson et al., 1995). This is
not a trivial result, in particular in times when mainstream parties’ ability and willingness
to respond to "the ordinary voter" is increasingly challenged, not least by populist parties
from various ideological backgrounds.
What is more, the electoral relevance approach we proposed in this paper has a more
general takeaway for research on responsiveness in post-industrial societies, which are char-
acterized by increasingly heterogeneous electorates. Existing studies often examine pref-
erences of specific constituencies without taking into account differences in size and, thus,
electoral relevance. To get a more encompassing understanding of political decision-making
and responsiveness, research needs to move beyond focusing solely particular subgroups’
preferences but also incorporate their specific electoral weight. A notable recent example
is Evans and Tilley’s (2017) analysis of long-term changes in class voting in Britain, which
explicitly takes into account the varying size of different societal strata over time.
Finally, we want to address a caveat of our approach. The political mobilization of par-
ticular subgroups of the electorate partly depends on parties’ programmatic offers and what
they offer in turn hinges on the relative electoral relevance of each group. Iteratively assess-
ing how strongly an increase in electoral relevance affects party programs and what such a
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programmatic move means for the political mobilization among the targeted groups is at the
heart of political science. Ideally one would combine supply- and demand-side in a dynamic
framework. However, the apparent endogeneity issues pose thorny empirical questions. We
believe that acknowledging the importance of both supply- and demand-side and assessing
them separately is a first (but not the last) step towards a more encompassing understanding
of both party strategies and citizen’s political decisions. Our analysis thus highlights new
avenues for further research. For example, studies concerned with the moderating impact of
social democratic (or any party’s) policy decisions on the share and prevalence of atypical
employment might incorporate our findings to arrive at a more encompassing picture of
feedback effects and policy-making in post-industrial societies.
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Notes
1Outsiders are either part-time workers (less than 30 hours), temporary workers or unemployed. Insiders
are workers with a full-time permanent working contract. The residual group, which Rueda calls "upscales",
are mainly high-skilled professionals in non-working-class jobs. See the section on operationalization for a
more detailed discussion of advantages and disadvantages of alternative classifications.
2To be clear, Figure 1 shows policy changes rather than levels. We do not mean to claim that outsiders
are better protected in the labor market than insiders. The literature on insider/outsider divides and labor
market flexibilization (Rueda, 2005; Palier and Thelen, 2010; Emmenegger et al., 2012) is unequivocal on the
fact that insiders enjoy higher employment protection than outsiders, have better access to unemployment
benefits, and that active labor market policies remain underdeveloped in most countries. But since we are
interested in explaining policy change over time within a country, our focus on labor market reforms rather
than levels of protection stands to reason.
3In Spain, for example, the recovery after the Great Recession is associated with a continued increase
of already widespread atypical work as temporary contracts account for the "large majority" of new hires
(OECD, 2016).
4We replicated Gingrich and Häusermann’s occupational classes to calculate the share of labor market
outsiders among their groups. Table SI2.1 in the Appendix reports outsider shares within the middle class,
manual workers, and routine workers. As expected, most manual blue-collar workers can be considered
archetypical labor market insiders: only few are affected by atypical employment. The middle classes
are slightly more affected by such atypical labor market contracts, especially in Continental and Southern
Europe (see also Häusermann et al., 2015). Finally, outsiders cluster in all the countries mainly in the
broadly operationalized group of routine workers.
5Note that Gingrich/Häusermann categorize low-skilled service and office workers into this group. Rou-
tineness is understood differently in the task-based literature in labor economics, which defines routine work
as "carrying out a limited and well-defined set of cognitive and manual activities, those that can be accom-
plished by following explicit rules" (Autor et al., 2003), meaning primarily semi-skilled blue- and white-collar
jobs.
6Given that large shifts in positions are relatively rare, most of the literature is concerned with positional
shifts within a political block or with varying salience of distinct policies, i.e. differential emphasis of one or
the other issue, for example in party manifestos (see, e.g., Bremer, 2018, for a more detailed discussion).
7Vlandas (2013) has pointed out that political parties implement different types of active labor market
policies. A descriptive breakdown of ALMP reforms into different subtypes (following (Bonoli, 2010)) and
cabinet ideology confirms that center-left compared to center-right cabinets enacted more upskilling reforms
and less employment incentive reforms (see Figure SI2.3 in the appendix).
8For a slightly modified more recent application, see Best (2011).
9For a comparison of these approaches, see Rovny and Rovny (2017).
10These countries are Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland,
France, Greece, Great Britain, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal and
Sweden. All countries have a per capita GDP higher than 25’000 international dollars and more than 3
million inhabitants (for a similar case selection see Beramendi et al. 2015, p. 4).
11Based on Armingeon et al. (2018), the following parties were classified as the main social democratic par-
ties: SP.A and PS (Belgium), SP (Switzerland), CSSD (Czech Republic), SPD (Germany), SD (Denmark),
PSOE (Spain), SDP (Finland), PS (France), Labour (Great Britain), MSZP (Hungary), Labour (Ireland),
Ulivo/PD (Italy), PvdA (Netherlands), A (Norway), SLD (Poland), PS (Portugal), SAP (Sweden).
12It is therefore not about the question whether outsiders and/or insiders prefer these policies or not. For
example, it may very well be the case that outsiders prefer rigid employment protection of permanent work
contracts (Emmenegger, 2009), even though they are not are not directly affected by such changes and hence
do not profit from such legislation.
13We can only calculate turnout and vote choice biannually due to data availability of the ESS. Since we are
dealing with slow-moving averages, we linearly impute the missing years, but only if there are observations
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one year before and one year after. We also ran all the models without the imputation and the linear
imputation does not change the substantive findings presented in the next part.
14In a majority of the cases, it is common to witness 50-100 percentage point changes (Czech Republic,
Denmark, Germany, Spain, France, Greece, Italy, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, UK, Hungary) and in
all the other countries, with the exception of Switzerland, 25-50 percentage point changes are no exception
(Austria, Belgium, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands).
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Appendix: Electoral Relevance by Country
Description: The first two columns show the relative group shares derived from EU-SILC,
the next two columns display the predicted probability to turnout for both groups and the
sixth and seventh column give the calculated probabilities to vote for the social democratic
party. The fifth and eight column shows the national average in turnout and the national
average of the social democratic vote share. Finally, the last four columns to the right-hand
side of Table A1 represent our estimates of electoral relevance, i.e. the product of the three
parameters for each group divided by the product of the two national parameters, as well as
the difference and the ratio in electoral relevance between insiders and outsiders. Take for
example the case in the first row, Denmark. According to our data, 44.3% of the votes for the
Danish Social Democrats come from insiders and only 11.9% from outsiders. The total adds
up to 100% with the few votes of labor market upscales, which are not considered typical
supporters of social democratic parties, and the considerable vote share among people not
in the labor force, mainly pensioners, who are an unlikely driving force behind labor market
policy. Reducing the sample to the labor force, as is often done in the insider/outsider
literature, would obviously increase vote shares massively but we deem the current numbers
both more telling and more intuitive.
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Table A1: Electoral Relevance of Insiders and Outsiders for Social Democrats, pooled years 2002-2016 (unconditional models)
Group Share Turnout Social Democratic Vote Electoral Relevance
Outsider Insider Outsider Insider National Outsider Insider National Outsider Insider diff ratio
Nordic
Denmark 12.9% 44.0% 90.0% 94.9% 93.5% 26.1% 26.9% 27.1% 11.9% 44.3% 32.4 3.7
Finland 14.0% 33.8% 74.4% 82.3% 82.9% 19.2% 22.1% 22.2% 10.9% 33.4% 22.5 3.1
Sweden 18.8% 40.2% 88.3% 92.8% 91.1% 34.5% 34.6% 33.1% 19.0% 42.7% 23.8 2.3
Norway 12.6% 46.3% 81.6% 88.0% 86.9% 31.2% 33.4% 33.0% 11.2% 47.5% 36.3 4.3
14.6% 41.1% 83.6% 89.5% 88.6% 27.7% 29.3% 28.9% 13.2% 42.0% 28.7 3.3
Liberal
United Kindgom 14.0% 34.0% 68.1% 70.2% 72.4% 40.4% 41.4% 39.9% 13.4% 34.2% 20.8 2.6
Ireland 20.8% 25.8% 71.5% 80.9% 77.9% 12.3% 11.2% 11.0% 21.4% 27.3% 5.9 1.3
17.4% 29.9% 69.8% 75.6% 75.2% 26.4% 26.3% 25.4% 17.4% 30.7% 13.3 1.9
Continental
Belgium 21.5% 30.0% 92.4% 94.9% 92.6% 30.0% 24.4% 25.4% 25.3% 29.6% 4.2 1.2
Germany 23.6% 29.8% 76.7% 84.4% 82.5% 32.4% 32.8% 32.0% 22.2% 31.2% 9.1 1.4
France 19.8% 32.9% 62.3% 72.8% 73.9% 34.4% 33.1% 33.0% 17.4% 32.6% 15.2 1.9
Netherlands 27.2% 27.3% 82.0% 84.7% 84.6% 20.9% 20.8% 20.6% 26.8% 27.7% 0.9 1.0
Switzerland 21.9% 31.6% 66.9% 65.1% 69.5% 22.5% 23.3% 22.1% 21.5% 31.3% 9.8 1.5
Austria 17.8% 33.4% 82.0% 84.2% 84.9% 30.2% 33.2% 33.0% 15.7% 33.3% 17.5 2.1
21.9% 30.8% 77.0% 81.0% 81.3% 28.4% 27.9% 27.7% 21.5% 30.9% 9.5 1.5
Southern
Spain 30.1% 24.9% 78.3% 83.8% 82.4% 45.9% 39.5% 40.5% 32.4% 24.7% -7.7 0.8
Italy 18.6% 24.9% 81.7% 87.7% 84.2% 32.7% 31.6% 31.9% 18.5% 25.6% 7.2 1.4
Portugal 20.8% 29.9% 64.4% 77.2% 74.0% 41.6% 38.4% 39.9% 18.9% 30.1% 11.2 1.6
Greece 19.5% 21.8% 88.2% 90.0% 89.8% 42.8% 42.1% 42.9% 19.1% 21.4% 2.3 1.1
22.2% 25.4% 78.1% 84.7% 82.6% 40.7% 37.9% 38.8% 22.2% 25.5% 3.2 1.2
Visegrad
Czech Republic 13.6% 36.1% 56.6% 64.6% 60.9% 31.6% 32.5% 32.3% 12.3% 38.6% 26.2 3.1
Hungary 13.5% 34.0% 71.4% 78.5% 75.9% 27.9% 27.5% 30.6% 11.6% 31.7% 20.1 2.7
Poland 22.7% 24.0% 64.6% 70.1% 70.0% 16.0% 16.6% 17.0% 19.7% 23.6% 38.0 1.2
16.6% 31.4% 64.2% 71.1% 69.0% 25.2% 25.5% 26.6% 14.5% 31.3% 16.7 2.4
Note: Relative groups shares are based on all pooled EU-SILC (2002-2015). Participation and social democratic vote shares are predicted probabilities based on unconditional
country-by-country logistic regressions of all pooled ESS Rounds 1-8 (2002-2016).
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Supplementary Information 1: Labor Market Policy Dataset
Coverage
Countries and time period: Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Germany, Greece, Nether-
lands, Portugal, and Spain; 2000-2016.
Policies: passive labor market policy (PLMP), active labor market policy (ALMP), em-
ployment protection legislation (EPL), early retirement (ER) and short-time work (STW).
Data Collection
This dataset collected reforms implemented on the national level. The data collection pro-
ceeded in several steps to ensure all the relevant policy reforms in the fields of labor market
and family policy reforms were gathered. In a first step, we collected all the information
on policy changes from the ILO’s NATLEX and TRAVAIL databases. Then we compared
these changes with the EU’s MISSOC database and the EUR-Lex database. In a second step,
we used the already existing LABREF database (2000-2016) and the Fondazione Rodolfo
DeBenedetti’s Social Reform Database (1980-2007) to check for potentially missing labor
market reforms. Already at this stage, there were only a few reforms that were not already
collected in the first stage. In a last step, we cross-checked the collected data with country-
specific secondary literature that describes the relevant reforms. Taken together, these three
steps assure that there no labor market reforms was missed. Table SI1.1 shows the number
of absolute and relative number policy changes by country and policy fields (ALMP, PLMP,
EPL, ER, STW).
Coding of the Policy Changes
The unit of analysis is a single reform: a collection of policy measures (policy changes),
which have been formally ratified in one document. Projected and rejected reform projects
are not part of the dataset. Multidimensional reform packages that affect more than just one
labor market institution (e.g. ALMP and PLMP) are coded separately for each institution
affected by the reform. Based on the detailed policy content collected, we then code each
policy change with respect to its distributional impact on labor market insiders and labor
market outsiders (+1, 0, or -1). In addition, each policy measure is weighted by 1 if it is a
comprehensive reform that addresses the broader design of existing systems or by 0.5 if it
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Table SI1.1: Number of Policy Changes by Country and Policy Instrument (2000-2016), abs. and
rel.
country ALMP PLMP EPL ER STW Total
Austria 39 22 25 10 11 107
36.45 20.56 23.36 9.35 10.28 100
Belgium 70 25 22 8 7 132
53.03 18.94 16.67 6.06 5.3 100
Germany 33 19 26 2 8 88
37.5 21.59 29.55 2.27 9.09 100
Spain 43 33 39 9 4 128
33.59 25.78 30.47 7.03 3.12 100
France 59 22 48 13 8 150
39.33 14.67 32 8.67 5.33 100
Greece 33 16 42 0 4 95
34.74 16.84 44.21 0 4.21 100
Italy 44 32 62 3 6 147
29.93 21.77 42.18 2.04 4.08 100
Netherlands 37 16 28 2 4 87
42.53 18.39 32.18 2.3 4.6 100
Portugal 49 30 23 7 2 111
44.14 27.03 20.72 6.31 1.8 100
Total 407 215 315 54 54 1045
38.95 20.57 30.14 5.17 5.17 100
is a marginal change. We do not code the reforms in terms of whether outsiders or insiders
prefer these policies. The focus lies exclusively to what extent policy changes directly affect
the labor market situation of insiders and outsiders. It is not about to what extent insiders
and outsiders actually differ in their preferences over these policies. In what follows, we
describe for each policy field how the reforms/policy changes were coded.
Employment Protection Legislation: Here we distinguish between standard (insider)
and atypical work (outsider) contracts. Rigid employment protection legislation for standard
employment contracts privileges insiders. Outsiders, on the other hand, are penalized since
their chance to enter standard employment decreases. Labor market reforms that only
improve EPL for the standard employed lead to a further dualization of the labor market.
Conversely, increasing EPL for atypical employment contracts (e.g. part-time or fixed-term
contracts) improves the situation of outsiders.
Passive Labor Market Policy: The distributional effects of passive labor market policies
(PLMPs) are more ambiguous. Rueda (2005) argues that PLMPs focus on the financial
support of the unemployed and are therefore pro-outsider policies. But there is a caveat:
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outsiders in social insurance welfare regimes (most Continental and Southern Europe) often
do not have sufficient social rights to access these schemes due to their atypical work bi-
ographies. Thus, eligibility conditions are of particular importance. For example, if policy
changes extend the eligibility conditions to fixed- term contracts, then the reform improves
the situation of outsiders. But PLMPs can also be manipulated to further exclude outsiders
and favor insiders, for example, by limiting the eligibility criteria to access PLMPs.
Active Labor Market Policy: There is a whole variety of Active labor market policies
(ALMPs). Rueda describes all ALMPs as "unambiguously pro-outsider" (2007, p. 73).
Although all types of ALMPs have in common that they aim at outsiders, not all of them can
be classified as pro-outsider policies. In particular, the measures of incentive reinforcement
(increasing conditionality between passive and active benefits, use of sanctions) often do not
improve the situation of outsiders but sanction them and force them to take any job offer
they get independent from whether it matches their skills and preferences (Bonoli, 2013).
All other ALMP types (employment assistance, upskilling, occupation) are pro-outsider.
Short-Time Work: Short-time work (STW) programs permit firms in times of crisis to
temporarily curb the working hours of full-time jobs without firing the employed. However,
not all workers benefit from these measures. Insiders usually benefit strongly from STW
programs as they keep their jobs, whereas outsiders are usually dismissed.
Early Retirement: Early retirement (ER) reforms aim at easing withdrawal from work.
ER reforms do not have clear-cut distributional effects. If ER is only granted to people with
a standard work biography who paid their social contributions for some 30/40 years, then
ER clearly favors insiders over outsiders. But if eligibility criteria to access ER programs
are widened to include atypical employees, then the change is pro-outsider.
Advantages and Disadvantages of the Measure
The advantages of such a measure are manifold. First, we try to clearly distinguish whether
a policy change improves/worsens the situation of insiders or/and outsiders. Second, coding
the actual policy output and not just looking at aggregate outcome variables such as social
spending can minimize the potential of confounding factors. Third, it allows us not only to
identify descriptive trends over time and across country, but to tie certain policy outputs to
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specific parties. By looking only at spending or other outcome data this is rarely possible.
It can be at times difficult to attribute certain spending outcomes to policies that usually
take a while to become visible in the outcome variable. Big reforms become only visible
in the budget years later and the incoming government can reap the benefits of reforms
implemented before they even took office. In order to avoid linking outcomes to the "wrong"
government, this measure can link policy output directly to the party in office.
There are also some concerns that can be leveled against this measure. One might raise
the question to what extent subjective assessment of how a given reform impact on the three
dimensions of consumption, investment and regulation is involved. Even though we have
coded all these reforms ourselves, a pre-test was designed to test the subjectivity of coding
decisions. Four persons were assigned to code the same 20 reforms and then agreement
scores were calculated. The results suggest that different coders evaluated the reforms in a
very similar way. In addition, the results of measure were always compared to the relevant
country-specific literature. A second drawback of this measure is that it implicitly assumes
that most policy changes have similar magnitude. Every policy change can only be coded
into one of five categories from -1 to +1 (direction X scope). As a consequence, this measure
should only be interpreted as an ordinal approximation to the actual effect.
41
Supplementary Information 2: Additional Figures and Tables
Table SI2.1: Share of outsiders among the middle classes, manual workers, and routine workers
Middle classes Manual workers Routine workers
Nordic
Denmark 16.3% 6.7% 23.9%
Finland 15.2% 12.6% 29.8%
Sweden 23.6% 11.6% 37.4%
Norway 16.7% 7.2% 27.9%
18.0% 9.5% 29.8%
Liberal
United Kingdom 15.7% 8.9% 21.3%
Ireland 19.8% 23.9% 35.2%
17.8% 16.4% 28.3%
Continental
Austria 21.6% 11.6% 35.4%
Belgium 23.8% 19.4% 49.7%
Switzerland 25.2% 17.0% 33.7%
Germany 24.7% 20.5% 43.5%
France 21.0% 17.2% 37.7%
Netherlands 36.2% 18.3% 39.5%
25.4% 17.3% 39.9%
Southern
Spain 29.9% 35.2% 52.2%
Greece 22.3% 18.2% 50.9%
Italy 19.9% 18.8% 30.8%
Portugal 20.6% 21.3% 31.7%
23.2% 23.4% 41.4%
Visegrad
Hungary 10.5% 16.7% 23.5%
Poland 24.3% 22.9% 35.6%
Czech Republic 13.2% 12.3% 30.9%
16.0% 17.3% 30.0%
Total Mean 21.1% 16.9% 35.3%
Note: The three occupational groups are based on Oesch’s 16-class scheme operationalized by
ISCO 2-digit codes and re-categorized relying on replication files provided by Jane Gingrich. The
displayed numbers are labor market outsiders as a share of total population averaged across all
years available in EU-SILC (2004-2015).
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Table SI2.2: Number of Observations of ESS Rounds 1-8, by Country
Country ESS1 ESS2 ESS3 ESS4 ESS5 ESS6 ESS7 ESS8 Total
Austria 2,228 2,164 2,298 0 0 0 1,762 1,994 10,446
Belgium 1,810 1,697 1,709 1,682 1,639 1,790 1,686 1,702 13,715
Switzerland 1,973 2,089 1,765 1,776 1,449 1,439 1,476 1,464 13,432
Czech Republic 1,343 2,934 0 1,955 2,324 1,941 2,082 2,186 14,765
Germany 2,812 2,742 2,829 2,691 2,898 2,832 2,938 2,726 22,468
Denmark 1,466 1,429 1,472 1,550 1,509 1,582 1,435 0 10,443
Spain 1,670 1,608 1,814 2,486 1,840 1,841 1,880 1,918 15,057
Finland 1,891 1,924 1,815 2,105 1,794 2,116 2,022 1,868 15,535
France 1,477 1,769 1,934 2,009 1,680 1,927 1,858 2,016 14,670
Great Britain 2,000 1,841 2,323 2,301 2,365 2,241 2,227 1,925 17,223
Greece 2,511 2,363 0 2,019 2,649 0 0 0 9,542
Hungary 1,610 1,430 1,489 1,506 1,535 1,962 1,663 1,580 12,775
Ireland 1,995 2,236 1,750 1,723 2,507 2,581 2,343 2,729 17,864
Italy 1,193 1,497 0 0 0 935 0 2,524 6,149
Netherlands 2,305 1,839 1,854 1,740 1,793 1,812 1,866 1,644 14,853
Norway 2,008 1,694 1,669 1,482 1,476 1,547 1,365 1,479 12,720
Poland 1,971 1,614 1,624 1,547 1,659 1,822 1,569 1,632 13,438
Portugal 1,444 2,008 2,180 2,296 2,104 2,117 1,227 1,249 14,625
Sweden 1,911 1,861 1,854 1,745 1,437 1,780 1,736 1,515 13,839
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Figure SI2.1: Probability to Vote for Social Democratic Party by Insider and Outsider compared to the National Average Social Democratic Vote Share
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Table SI2.3: Electoral Relevance of Insiders and Outsiders for Social Democrats, pooled years 2002-2016 (conditional models)
Group Share Turnout Social Democratic Vote Electoral Relevance
Outsider Insider Outsider Insider National Outsider Insider National Outsider Insider diff
Nordic
Denmark 12.9% 44.0% 93.9% 94.4% 93.5% 26.0% 29.3% 27.1% 12.3% 47.9% 35.5
Finland 14.0% 33.8% 81.4% 81.7% 82.9% 21.3% 24.1% 22.2% 13.2% 36.1% 22.9
Sweden 18.8% 40.2% 92.2% 92.3% 91.1% 34.2% 35.8% 33.2% 19.7% 44.0% 24.3
Norway 12.6% 46.3% 86.3% 88.0% 86.9% 31.2% 34.7% 33.0% 11.8% 49.3% 37.5
14.6% 41.1% 88.4% 89.1% 88.6% 28.2% 31.0% 28.9% 14.3% 44.3% 30.1
Liberal
United Kindgom 14.0% 34.0% 73.3% 72.6% 72.4% 38.2% 41.1% 39.9% 13.6% 35.1% 21.5
Ireland 20.8% 25.8% 78.4% 82.0% 77.9% 10.9% 9.9% 11.0% 20.7% 24.6% 3.9
17.4% 29.9% 75.9% 77.3% 75.1% 24.6% 25.5% 25.5% 17.2% 29.8% 12.7
Continental
Belgium 21.5% 30.0% 92.4% 93.8% 92.6% 28.6% 25.2% 25.4% 24.2% 30.2% 6.0
Germany 23.6% 29.8% 81.3% 83.6% 82.5% 33.7% 34.6% 32.0% 24.5% 32.6% 8.1
France 19.8% 32.9% 72.4% 75.5% 73.9% 35.6% 33.1% 33.0% 20.9% 33.8% 12.8
Netherlands 27.2% 27.3% 85.8% 85.7% 84.6% 20.4% 21.3% 20.6% 27.3% 28.6% 1.3
Switzerland 21.9% 31.6% 72.5% 68.9% 69.5% 23.0% 23.6% 22.1% 23.7% 33.5% 9.8
Austria 17.8% 33.4% 86.6% 85.4% 84.9% 32.1% 37.4% 33.0% 17.7% 38.1% 20.4
21.9% 30.8% 81.8% 82.2% 81.3% 28.9% 29.2% 27.7% 23.1% 32.8% 9.7
Southern
Spain 30.1% 24.9% 82.5% 83.2% 82.4% 45.2% 41.4% 40.5% 33.6% 25.8% -7.9
Italy 18.6% 24.9% 87.9% 88.3% 84.2% 39.2% 33.2% 31.8% 23.8% 27.2% 3.3
Portugal 20.8% 29.9% 69.3% 78.3% 74.0% 44.3% 40.4% 39.9% 21.7% 32.1% 10.5
Greece 19.5% 21.8% 90.4% 91.4% 89.8% 41.6% 43.0% 42.9% 19.1% 22.2% 3.2
22.2% 25.4% 82.5% 85.3% 82.6% 42.6% 39.5% 38.8% 24.5% 26.8% 2.3
Visegrad
Czech Republic 13.6% 36.1% 57.8% 63.0% 60.9% 31.4% 36.4% 32.3% 12.5% 42.2% 29.7
Hungary 13.5% 34.0% 76.4% 78.5% 75.9% 31.8% 31.3% 30.6% 14.1% 36.0% 21.9
Poland 22.7% 24.0% 70.1% 71.7% 70.0% 17.0% 17.5% 17.0% 22.7% 25.3% 2.5
16.6% 31.4% 68.1% 71.1% 69.0% 26.7% 28.4% 26.6% 16.4% 34.5% 18.0
Note: Relative groups shares are based on EU-SILC (2002-2015). Participation and social democratic vote shares are predicted probabilities based on country-by-country
logistic regressions of ESS Rounds 1-8 (2002-2016) including control variables (sex, age, education, household income, religiosity, union membership). Unconditional predicted











































Figure SI2.2: Effects of all labor market reforms on insiders and outsiders, by country, 2000-2016
(Source: own data, see appendix)
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(f) Insider-Reform, Kernel Estimator
Figure SI2.4: Tests for Non-Linearity of Interaction Effects
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Figure SI2.5: Interaction LeftGov with electoral relevance of insiders on ALMP and PLMP
spending with 95%-confidence intervals (based on Model 4 and 8 in Table 2). Histograms show the
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Figure SI2.6: Strength of social democratic parties measured by the share of cabinet posts (Source:
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Figure SI2.7: Spending on active labor market policy in % of GDP, by country 2000-2016 (Source:
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Figure SI2.8: Spending on passive labor market policy in % of GDP, by country 2000-2016
(Source: Armingeon et al. 2018)
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